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Much has been written about the tendency toward insider control in tran- 
sitional economies (Aoki and Kim 1995). Indeed, this phenomenon poses 
a serious challenge for the governance of enterprises in which the usual 
institutions for external monitoring are missing or underdeveloped. 
We investigate the monitoring of enterprises subject to a form of insider 
control, business groups, in which a family typically has control over mul- 
tiple enterprises. Our research setting is India, an economy in the process 
of significant deregulation beginning in 1991. We investigate the interac- 
tion between three different kinds of concentrated ownership in India: the 
insider ownership held by the families that manage the firms that consti- 
tute the business groups; the ownership held by domestic financial institu- 
tions, typically acting in concert; and the ownership held by foreign finan- 
cial institutions, recent arrivals on the Indian economic landscape. 
A review of the literature suggests that the external monitoring of group 
affiliates poses more challenges than that of unaffiliated firms. Groups are 
reputed to be less transparent than nongroups and to have more opportu- 
nities, given their more complicated structures, to engage in questionable 
practices to the detriment of minority shareholders. Their generally better 
links to the political  apparatus in  the country also insulate them from 
external interference and monitoring. Domestic financial institutions, the 
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primary source of institutional investment in India until economic liberal- 
ization in  1991, are generally insufficiently oriented, if  at all, toward the 
task of monitoring  managers and are thus unlikely to exercise effective 
governance. Foreign institutional investors, who were allowed to partici- 
pate in Indian  stock markets in recent years, bring with them from ad- 
vanced capital markets not only fresh capital but also monitoring skills. 
Our evidence suggests that domestic financial institutions in India are 
ineffective monitors, whereas foreign institutional investment is associated 
with significant monitoring benefits: firm performance is positively corre- 
lated with the presence of  foreign institutional ownership and negatively 
correlated with the presence of domestic institutional ownership. Surpris- 
ingly, however, we find that there is no evidence of a difference in this rela- 
tionship  between  group affiliates and unaffiliated  firms, suggesting that 
monitoring is no less effective for group affiliates than it is for unaffiliated 
firms. At first glance, the lack of transparency of groups does not appear to 
pose a differential impediment to monitoring by foreign institutional in- 
vestors. 
We probe this further by investigating factors correlated with the pres- 
ence of greater foreign institutional ownership (and compare those factors 
to factors correlated  with  the presence of greater domestic institutional 
ownership). After controlling for industry fixed effects, firm size, and the 
past performance  of  firms, we  find  that foreign  owners are indeed less 
likely to invest in group affiliates than in unaffiliated  firms, perhaps be- 
cause of the problems associated with monitoring groups. However, when 
they do invest in groups, they appear to seek out those groups where the 
transparency problem, as proxied by the greater incidence of intragroup 
financial transactions, is lowest. 
We interpret this collective evidence as suggesting that foreign institu- 
tional investors are a source of not only financing but also scarce monitor- 
ing skills in emerging markets like India. Given the rapidly accumulating 
evidence of the failure of domestic intermediaries in a number of emerg- 
ing markets and the recent opening up to foreign investment of dozens 
of countries (Sachs and Warner  1995), these results regarding the nature 
of investments sought by foreign institutional investors and the effects of 
such investments are worthy of note. Our evidence is also consistent with 
the idea that groups are difficult for external agencies to monitor. 
The rest  of the paper is organized  as follows. Section  9.1 provides a 
literature review and some background  on the state of monitoring inter- 
mediaries in the Indian context. Section 9.2 describes our data, section 9.3 
our results. Section 9.4 concludes. Business Groups, Foreign Intermediaries, and Corporate Governance  267 
9.1  Institutional Background 
9.1.1  Monitoring in Emerging Markets 
Shleifer and Vishny (I  986) point out that, by partially internalizing the 
externality inherent in providing monitoring services, large shareholders 
can reduce the incidence of agency problems that arise from the diver- 
gence of interests between managers and shareholders. According to Aoki 
(1993, however, this is a “necessary” rather than a “sufficient” condition 
for the provision  of monitoring  services. Indeed,  in emerging  markets, 
there are several reasons why existing monitoring is inadequate. 
Perhaps the most important of these has to do with the absence of spe- 
cialized intermediaries that perform monitoring services’ or with the lack 
of  skills in or incentives  offered to such intermediaries  as do exist. As 
Holderness and Sheehan (1991, 326) point out, while it is true that larger 
shareholders have a greater incentive to monitor, “firm value will not in- 
crease if the blockholder lacks the pertinent managerial skills.” Examples 
from emerging markets regarding the paucity of such skills abound. Qian 
(1  995) discusses the creation of a monitoring vacuum in China following 
the cessation of state monitoring of its enterprises. Frydman et al. (1993) 
point out that, in Russia, commercial banks have no experience with mar- 
ket accounting and governance and are therefore in no position to hold 
management’s feet to the fire. Rapaczynski (1996,99), describing the situa- 
tion in Eastern Europe, reports that the “various supervisory bodies are 
generally rudderless, incapable of genuine monitoring.” 
Litwack (1995) adds that it is unclear whether such financial institutions 
as do exist have the incentives  to invest in monitoring  skills. Financial 
institutions may have conflicts of interest that discourage them from devel- 
oping such skills. Such conflicts of interest appear to exist in Israel (Blass, 
Yafeh, and Yosha 1997).’ Indeed, the emergence of concentrated blocks 
of shareholders does not appear to be synonymous with the provision of 
monitoring  services3 Berglof  (1 995) points out that, despite investment 
privatization funds holding concentrated blocks of equity, there are few 
1. This begs the question  of why competent intermediaries have not emerged. There is 
ongoing theoretical discussion about the circumstances under which intermediaries will find 
it profitable to collect and disseminate information about firms.  Under an assumption of 
fixed costs of  gathering information,  there are good  reasons to expect intermediaries to 
emerge (Diamond 1984), but perhaps markets are not large enough (Grossman and Stiglitz 
1980) or liquid enough (Kyle 1984; Holmstrom and Tirole 1993) to foster this process. 
2. For example, a fund manager might buy shares so as to boost the value of shares held 
by a bank with which the fund manager is affiliated. In advanced economies, such potential 
conflicts of interest are often mitigated through “fire-wall” structures (see Kroszner and Ra- 
jan 1997). 
3. The theoretical literature on financial market intermediation (Diamond 1984; Krasa 
and Villamil 1992) posits that diversification of the financial institution’s investments ensures 
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signs in the Czech Republic of such “control blocks” translating into ac- 
tive corporate governance. It goes without saying that further specializa- 
tion in the monitoring process, depending on the type of monitoring, is 
completely ab~ent.~ 
A second reason for the lack of  monitoring has to do with the poor 
availability of information. There are usually no strict disclosure norms, and 
enforcement of existing disclosure rules is lax. Akamatsu (1995) points out 
that, of five thousand enterprises privatized in Russia, only one hundred 
publish financial statements; among these, balance sheets typically consist 
of three lines on the assets side and two lines on the liabilities side, with 
no explanatory notes. Intermediaries that specialize in the gathering of in- 
formation (such as analysts) are generally absent or not as skilled as those 
in advanced  economies. In Chile, managers report  that, even after two 
decades of financial market reform, domestic analysts are not nearly  as 
skilled as foreign analysts (Khanna and Wu  1998). 
Finally, even if monitors with the appropriate skill levels exist and have 
the appropriate incentives  to perform  their  function, there  are impedi- 
ments to their doing so. First, numerous firms in most emerging markets 
have a large insider shareholding that makes it difficult for intermediaries 
to monitor and impose di~cipline.~  The high level of insider shareholding 
may imply that insufficient shares trade (as in China [Xu and Wang 1997]), 
making a disciplinary takeover difficult. The absence of minority-share- 
holder rights further complicates this situation (La Porta et al. 1998). Sec- 
ond, numerous firms have political connections that make the imposition 
of discipline impractical.6 
9.1.2  The Indian Institutional Context 
All these barriers to monitoring activity exist in India.’ In fact, in De- 
cember  1991, a landmark committee set up to review the state of the fi- 
nancial sector, the Narasimhan Committee, admitted that loans had not 
and so need not exert undue effort in monitoring the monitor. As an empirical matter, we do 
not know thc extent to which failure of financial institutions in emerging markets to provide 
monitoring services is due to a failure to monitor the financial institutions themselves. 
4. For example, Roe (1990, 36) refers to “specialized monitoring that financial institutions 
can do well” and distinguishes between different types of monitoring. Aoki (1995) distin- 
guishes between ex ante, interim, and ex post monitoring; different kinds of monitoring are 
performed by different kinds of financial intermediaries in advanced economies. 
5. Stuiz (1990) argues that the probability of takeover is inversely related to the level of 
insider shareholding. 
6. Fisman (1998) provides cvidence of the effect of such connections in Indonesia. Kros- 
zner (1998) suggests that foreign banks will be less subject to such local political pressure 
and that monitoring by financial intermediaries is therefore likely to be better in economies 
where foreign banks are allowed to enter freely. 
7. Since our data span the period 1990-94,  we confine ourselves to commenting on the 
Indian institutional context during this period. This part of the discussion draws from mul- 
tiple sources, prominent among which are SEBI (1994), Goswami and Mohan (1996), and 
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been monitored for decades. The first reason for the poor monitoring of 
Indian firms is that monitoring is not the primary objective of the domi- 
nant financial institutions (almost  exclusively state-run banks). Indeed, 
until  1991, the objective of government policy was to maximize loans to 
the industrial sector in the belief that this would lead to industrial develop- 
ment. The major financial institutions were often instructed not to disturb 
management  and to side with management  in the event of any dispute; 
they virtually never divested their ownership stake in any firm. 
Second, financial institutions were never provided  with any incentives 
to monitor. Pouring more money after a bad loan in the hope that the 
distressed firm would find its way  out of trouble was consistent with the 
objective of maximizing loans. Further, this was often a preferable course 
of action given the difficulty of shutting down failing firms under the Sick 
Industrial Firms Act. Of course, this implicit soft budget constraint led to 
moral hazard problems on the part of firms. 
Third, competition among financial intermediaries was nonexistent for 
several reasons:  (a) Government  restrictions  on lending  terms, interest 
rates, and conditions governing equity ownership eliminated the primary 
bases on which competition might have occurred. (b)  There was a great 
deal of consortium lending. (c) All public banks were members of the In- 
dian Banks Association (IBA), which functioned as a de facto cartel and 
played a major role in fixing wages, prices, and service conditions. (d)  Fi- 
nally, under the pre-1991 “license raj,” once an entrepreneur received a 
permit from the government to engage in some form of economic activity, 
support from the state-run financial institutions was more or less guaran- 
teed. This had the indirect implication that lobbying and political interfer- 
ence in the real sector translated into similar rent-seeking behavior in the 
financial sector. Indeed, there were accusations of “financial preemption” 
directed against certain entrepreneurs who sought to restrict finances from 
becoming available to others by exercising their political muscle. “Indus- 
trial embassies” were maintained in the capital by prominent businesses 
toward this end (Encarnation  1989). 
Finally,  intermediaries  were  never  monitored  themselves.  As  late  as 
1992, banks illegally lent stockbrokers money that the latter used to en- 
gage in speculation, leading ultimately to a drastic market crash and the 
exposure of much fraudulent behavior. 
In addition to the absence of potential monitoring by banks, there were 
also constraints on monitoring by external capital markets. The Compa- 
nies Act placed restrictions on the acquisition and transfer of shares and 
so prevented the development of a market for corporate control. With half 
to two-thirds of the equity in any firm being illiquid (since the entrepre- 
neurs and the financial institutions never sold their shares), takeovers were 
difficult to implement. 
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ernance front, however, since India's  199  1 balance-of-payments crisis: (a) 
The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Act of 1992 created 
a regulatory body with the explicit mandate to improve the functioning 
of Indian financial markets. (h)  The incentives  given state-run financial 
institutions to monitor were improved. They began to be weaned off their 
historically privileged access to funds. The resulting need to access public 
capital markets made them more conscious of the bad loans on their bal- 
ance sheets. The deregulation of interest rates and the gradual elimination 
of consortium requirements  increased competition among the financial 
institutions. Private-sector mutual funds were allowed to compete with the 
state monopoly. (e)  A takeover code was introduced in late 1994, after a pub- 
lic outcry over legally sanctioned price rigging.8  (d)  Restrictions on the entry 
of foreign investors were eliminated, and regulations on their investments 
were  substantially  clarified.  Salient features included  no limitations  on 
minimum and maximum investments, no lock-in period  for such invest- 
ments, reduction in long- and short-term capital gains taxes, free repatria- 
tion of capital subject to payment of taxes, and a ceiling under which the 
maximum investment  by  a foreign institutional investor in a single firm 
could be up to 5 percent of voting rights (with an aggregate investment 
limit of 24 percent for all foreign institutional investors in a single firm). 
However, as of 1994, Indian corporate governance was still deficient for 
many reasons, including the following: (a) SEBI had found that it had in- 
sufficient power to police violations of  regulation^.^ It continued to adapt 
and modify regulations as it learned more about how to regulate financial 
markets. (b)  Takeovers continued to be difficult given the paucity of timely 
information and high transactions costs in both the primary and the sec- 
ondary equity markets.'" (e) There was still little competition among fi- 
nancial intermediaries. The state-run intermediaries were still saddled with 
bad loans, which affected their ability to act as monitors. (d)  Disclosure 
problems continued to abound. Financial results were published only at 
half-yearly  intervals, and the absence of consolidated  accounts reduced 
the transparency of business-group performance. 
8. In  1993-94,  many firms issued preferential equity allotments to the controlling share- 
holders at steeply discounted prices. 
9. In a celebrated 1995 case, the stock price of the firm MS Shoes was driven up sharply 
prior to a new issue by misinformation in its prospectus combined with price rigging. This 
triggered a series of events that closed down the country's primary stock exchange, the Bom- 
bay Stock Exchange, for three days and exposed inadequacies in the regulation of merchant 
bankers and underwriters, too many poor-quality stock issues, information-disclosure prob- 
lems, etc. 
10. A detailed account can be found in SEBI (1994). The need to transact physically im- 
poses limits on trading volumes and on the speed at which orders can be handled. With the 
open outcry system (as opposed to screen-based trading), it is difficult to establish audit 
trails. There were no depositories, making settlement difficult (and no legislative means to 
establish depositories). Trades were often consummated outside the exchange. This left much 
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9.1.3 
Failure to monitor  in India,  as in  several other emerging economies, 
leads to severe costs. But policy prescriptions require a better understand- 
ing of the factors that exacerbate, and those that mitigate, such costs. This, 
in turn, is likely to be based on a richer understanding of the form that 
insider control takes and of the nature of the interaction between the insid- 
ers and the outside monitors. Very few studies, however, have paid atten- 
tion to the form that insider control takes. In particular, many large corpo- 
rations in most emerging markets are members of business groups, often 
family controlled.“ While these groups may serve some useful functions,I2 
they have a handful of features that make them likely to be less well moni- 
tored than nongroup affiliates in the country in question. All these features 
are commonly believed to be true about many Indian groups. 
First, groups are generally alleged to suffer from a greater lack of trans- 
parency than stand-alone unaffiliated firms and thereby to be less suscep- 
tible to pressure from external monitors. This lack of transparency generally 
has to do with the ability of the controlling shareholders to move funds 
across firms within the group, often without  adequate disclosure.  Such 
lending to related  parties, and the associated lack of accountability, has 
been viewed as the source of some celebrated financial market failures in 
recent times in emerging markets.”  The lack of transparency also arises, 
especially in many economies in Asia and Latin America, because groups 
are controlled by  extended families that strive to protect their privacy by 
revealing very little of the group’s internal activities. 
Second, a common characteristic  of groups in  many  countries is the 
presence of equity interlocks among the member firms.I4  These exacerbate 
the transparency problem, particularly when the interlocks involve firms 
that are not publicly traded. The financial interlocks are also commonly 
Relative Monitoring Costs for Groups and Nongroups 
11, For broad discussions of the phenomenon of business groups in different countries, 
see  Leff  (1976, 1978), Amsden and Hikino (1994), Granovetter (1994), and Khanna and 
Palcpu (1997). For Central America, see Strachan (1976). For Belgium, see Daems (1977). 
For  France, see  Encaoua and Jacquemin (1982). For Indonesia, see Robison (1986) and 
Schwartz (1992). For India, see Ghemawat and Khanna (1998), Herdeck and Piramal(1985). 
Piramal  (1996), and Ghemawat  and  Khanna (1998). For  Japan, see  Caves and  Uekusa 
(1976), Goto (1982), Aoki (1990), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991), and Berglof and 
Perotti (1994). For Korea, see Chang and Choi (1988) and Amsden (1989). For Mexico, see 
Camp (1989). For Pakistan, see White (1974). 
12. Khanna and Palepu (1997, 1999,2000,  in press), and Fisman and Khanna (1998) have 
documented some of the useful roles that groups play in India and Chile. 
13. A prominent and much-studied example is that of Chile’s financial collapse in the early 
1980s (see, e.g., the overview in Bosworth, Dornbusch, and Laban [1994]).  Unaccounted-for 
lending and inadequate supervision among business groups are also among the cited causes 
of the governance problems in the recent financial crisis in Asia. 
14. See, e.g., Daems (1977) on interlocks in Belgium, Nyberg (1995) on Sweden and Japan, 
and Berglof (1995) on the nontransparent web of cross-holdings in Hungary that protects in- 
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believed to be an antitakeover defense mechanism, again insulating firms 
from control by outsiders. 
Third, groups are generally able to reap economies of scale by lobbying 
the political apparatus and securing favors from bureaucrats and politi- 
cians. This is the root of much of the asserted rent-seeking behavior in 
which groups are often believed to indulge. One form of such rent seeking 
is to use political connections to prevent outside intervention and to erect 
barriers to competition in those areas in which groups are disproportion- 
ately active. 
9.2  Data 
9.2.1  Data Sources and Sample Selection 
The data for our research are obtained primarily from a publicly avail- 
able database maintained by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Econ- 
omy (CMIE). CMIE is a privately run, twenty-year-old,  Bombay-based 
firm that maintains databases on private- and public-sector economic ac- 
tivity in India. The database from which we draw our information is analo- 
gous to an abridged  version  of  the Compustat  database in the  United 
States.I5  The database has computerized information drawn from the an- 
nual reports, other regulatory filings, and press releases of several thou- 
sand firms operating in India as well as daily stock prices for firms on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). Of all the firms in the database, approxi- 
mately half are traded on the BSE, with the remainder traded on the sev- 
eral other stock exchanges in the country. In the version of the database 
to which we have access, the most information is available for 1993. Cover- 
age for subsequent years is sparser owing to delayed release of information 
by the firms and delays in updating the database. 
The data set that we use in our analysis consists of all non-group- and 
group-affiliated Indian private-sector firms listed on the BSE with the re- 
quired data. We  confine our analysis in this paper to the BSE firms be- 
cause these are the only firms for which ownership data are available and 
because we use stock-price data in our tests. For those estimations for which 
a year of data suffices, we choose 1993 because it is the year for which the 
coverage of BSE firms is complete. For those estimations for which we need 
data at two points in time, we identify a subset of BSE firms for which we 
have data for both 1990 and 1994 and examine the changes between these 
two time periods. 
15. CMIE sells this database under the name CIMM  (Computerized Information on Mag- 
netic Medium). CIMM has become a standard database used by  researchers and manage- 
ment professionals to analyze Indian corporations. As a recent example, Ahuja and Ma- 
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9.2.2  Identifying Business-Group Affiliation 
The identification of a firm’s business-group affiliation is of particular 
importance for our empirical tests. For this purpose, we  adopt the data- 
base’s classification of firms into groups.i6  The identification of group mem- 
bership is more reliable in India than in several other countries for at least 
two reasons.  First, unlike in a variety of countries (Strachan 1976; Goto 
1982), firms in India are members of only one group. Further, there is vir- 
tually no movement of firms across groups because of little merger activity 
in India.” 
As a check on the quality of group construction, we verify data from the 
CMIE database against detailed case studies that identify firms of three 
prominent groups, Tata (Khanna, Palepu, and Wu  1998), Thapar (Ghe- 
mawat 1996), and RPG Enterprises (Khanna 1996). We also perform simi- 
lar tests for a random sample of smaller groups largely to our satisfaction. 
Finally, we also verify that the names of groups that appear within the top 
one hundred (by sales or assets) appear on lists published by  prominent 
business  magazines’* and that large  groups mentioned  in historical  ac- 
counts  (Herdeck and Piramal  1985) are present  in  our database  if the 
groups survive to this day.I9 
The largest groups are very diversified, employ hundreds of thousands 
16. While a group is not a legal construct, CMIE uses a variety of sources to classify firms 
into groups. Prior to the repeal of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act in 
1991, a comprehensive list of firms belonging to “large industrial houses” was published by 
the government. This forms a starting point for the CMIE classification for a number of the 
groups. Beyond this, those  promoting a firm when  it was first started are identified and 
whether the original owners remained affiliated with the firm traced; the interest that a group 
has in a particular firm as revealed by  its presence on the board of directors is identified; 
also consulted are announcements by  individual firms of the groups with which  they are 
affiliated and lists of affiliated firms that are made public by  the groups (such information 
appears periodically in annual reports and advertisements and, at the time of public offer- 
ings, in  news releases about the groups’ and the firms’ plans for the future). CMIE also 
regularly monitors changes in group structure. Shifts in group affiliation are extremely rare, 
but, when they do occur, they are reflected in the database. Note that the database does not 
contain a historical record of each firm’s affiliation with different groups; rather, the group- 
membership variable reflects the most current affiliation. There is  no ambiguity between 
CMIE’s classification of firms into groups and classifications attempted by  other sources 
against which we cross-checked the data. 
17. In the case of family-controlled groups, succession from one generation to another 
often results in the group being split into multiple parts. We  identified several prominent 
groups that had  gone through such  periods of  succession in the past  twenty  years and 
checked to see that CMIE had indeed classified each subgroup separately. Thus, the Birla 
group is classified in several different parts, as is the group originally run by the Goenkas. 
18. The Economic Times, a daily financial newspaper analogous to the Wall Street Journal; 
Business India and Business World, analogous to Fortune or Forbes. 
19. Note that there are a small number of groups for which information on only one firm 
is available for a particular year. Such firms are nonetheless classified as group affiliated. The 
classification as group or nongroup is  not inferred solely from the number of entries ap- 
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of people, and are very complex to  Firms in Indian groups are 
tied  by  a common ownership  of a significant  block  of  shares in group 
firms, often by a family. This family ownership cements formal and informal 
relationships among group firms. The large groups also appear to have the 
best relationships with the bureaucracy, a fact that confers ongoing advan- 
tages in an economy enmeshed in a “kafkaesque maze of controls” (Bhag- 
wati 1993). 
Our analysis primarily focuses on the performance of individual firms 
rather than on group performance. We  think that it is sensible to run our 
estimations using firm-level performance measures rather than group-level 
measures for several reasons. First, each firm is a publicly traded entity 
responsible to its own shareholders. Indeed, the group itself, the clarity of 
its identification notwithstanding, is not a legal construct. The separate le- 
gal standing of each firm implies that there are ownership-structure differ- 
ences across firms in a group. Second, a great deal of variation in perfor- 
mance would  be lost if  we  aggregated  firm performance measures  into 
group measures. Indeed,  industry-adjusted  performance varies  substan- 
tially across the members of a group. Third, groups differ in the extent to 
which firms are bound together by social and economic ties. Using group- 
level performance measures implicitly assumes that the extent of interlock 
is similar across groups. Instead, we  use an estimation approach in order 
explicitly to recognize that there are group-level unobservables that cause 
the error term in our specifications to be correlated across members of a 
particular group. 
Because  Indian  business  groups are a collection  of  public firms, the 
group’s ability to use “internal capital markets” to fund the ongoing activi- 
ties of  one group firm from the cash flows of the other  group firms is 
limited. Therefore, the most important role of the group’s internal capital 
market is to launch new ventures, in which both the family and the other 
group affiliates might acquire ownership stakes. In this respect, Indian busi- 
ness groups are closer to the leveraged-buyout (LBO) associations than to 
the diversified public corporations in the United States. 
A comparison to Japanese keiretsu is also instructive. The main bank in 
the keiretsu has been likened to a central office in a large firm, “providing 
capital and managerial  support, in exchange for . . . an ownership stake 
in the firm and some say in how it is run” (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharf- 
stein  1991, 40), although  the keiretsu firms  have weaker  links than do 
divisions of a U.S. firm. Like the keiretsu firms, firms in an Indian group 
are legally separate entities, have their own shareholders, and publish their 
own  statements.  By regulatory  fiat, however,  there  is no group-specific 
20. For an analysis that shows that the performance effects of affiliation with a diversified 
business group are quite different in a country such as India than they are in an advanced 
economy such as the United States, see Khanna and Palepu (1997). Business Groups, Foreign Intermediaries, and Corporate Governance  275 
bank in India. Nonetheless, there is some coordination of actions among 
group members, partially orchestrated through common board members 
and through the involvement of the family in each group. 
9.2.3 
We use as our primary dependent variable a proxy for Tobin’s q, which 
we  define as (market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + 
book value of debt)/(book value of assets), where the market value of eq- 
uity is calculated using closing stock prices on the last trading day of  the 
year.2’ Data limitations preclude us from computing as close an approxi- 
mation to Tobin’s q as some prior studies have done.22  However, the data 
we use is superior in an important way. Prior U.S. studies do not have line- 
of-business Tobin’s q’s  as the data needed to compute these are not avail- 
able; they have accordingly had to compare the Tobin’s q’s  of diversified 
firms  to comparable  portfolios  of  Tobin’s q’s  of  single-line-of-business 
firms. Since firms in Indian groups are separately traded, we can compute 
the equivalent of line-of-business Tobin’s q’s and can therefore perform a 
more direct comparison than has been feasible using US. data. 
The analysis rests on various  categories of ownership measures. For- 
eign institutional ownership aggregates ownership of foreign corporations 
as well as that of foreign financial intermediaries. Domestic institutional 
ownership aggregates ownership in the hands of all state-run financial in- 
termediaries, including banks supervised by both the central and the state 
governments, state-run insurance firms, and state-run mutual funds. In- 
sider ownership includes the stakes held by the group family members and 
by other group firms, and, for nongroup firms, it measures the stakes held 
by  insiders. This measure  is a little difficult to interpret  since it stands 
for somewhat different things for group affiliates and for nongroup firms. 
Directors’ ownership captures the ownership of nonfamily directors. Fi- 
nally, top fifty ownership captures the largest shareholders not captured 
in the categories listed above. 
Finally, we need to define certain terms used in our analyses of the deter- 
minants of the levels of foreign and domestic institutional ownership. In 
particular,  for the group affiliates, we  use three measures  of intragroup 
financial transactions: investments in group firms is the firm’s total invest- 
ment in shares and debentures of other group affiliates; receivables  from 
groupjrms includes short-term deposits and loans (those with a maturity 
Definitions of Dependent and Independent Variables 
21. None of the results are sensitive to the use of prices at different times, or an average 
market price over the year, for the construction of our approximation to Tobin’s 4. 
22. Other studies that have computed q in some detail include Lindenberg and Ross (1981), 
Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988), Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988), and Lang and 
Stulz (1994). Lang and Stulz (1994), eg,  use several years of data to compute the replace- 
ment value of assets under some assumptions, a step that we  are unable to replicate as we 
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of less than one year) given by the firm to others in the group; loans  from 
groupjirms is the loans received by the firm from others in the group. Past 
performance is defined as the simple average of as many annual measures 
of Tobin’s q (computed as above) as are available for the firm in question. 
Variability in past performance is defined as the variance of daily stock 
returns over the prior year. 
9.3  Results 
9.3.1  Summary Statistics 
Table 9.1 reports some summary statistics for our sample of firms, using 
1993 data. The sample consists of 567 group affiliates and 437 unaffiliated 
firms, all publicly traded on the BSE. The group affiliates are members of 
252 different groups, with 95 percent of the groups having five or fewer 
Table 9.1  Summary Statistics 
Variable 
Group Firms  Nongroup Firms 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Sales (million rupees) 
Age (years) 
Tobin’s 4 
Change in Tobin’s 4 
Ownership by  foreign institutional 
Ownership by Indian institutional 
Ownership by insiders (‘%) 
Directors’ ownership (YO) 
Top fifty owners excluding the 
above categories PA)) 











































Source; Data obtained from CMIE for 567 affiliates of 252 different groups and for 437 unaffiliated 
firms traded on the BSE. 
Note: The summary statistics in this table are based on 1993 values.  Tobin’s q is defined  as (market 
value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book value of debt)/(book value of assets). Sales 
are measured in millions of rupees, with an approximate exchange rate at this time of U.S.$I.OO = 
Rs 30.00. Age measures number of years since incorporation. Foreign institutional ownership aggre- 
gates ownership of foreign corporations as well as that of foreign financial intermediaries. Domestic 
institutional  ownership aggregates ownership in the hands of all state-run financial intermediaries. 
Insider ownership includes the stakes held  by  group family members and by  other group firms and 
measures stakes held by  insiders for nongroup firms. Directors’ ownership captures the ownership of 
nonfamily directors. Top fifty ownership captures the largest shareholders not included in aforemen- 
tioned categories. Group membership is based on definitions of groups from CMIE and is described 
in the text. The mean and median values for all the variables except for the mean value of Tobin’s 4 
and change  in  Tobin’s 4  are significantly different  between  the group and nongroup firms at the 
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affiliates traded  on  the  BSE and the largest group  having twenty one 
affiliates traded on the BSE. The mean (median) sales of the firms in the 
sample are Rs 962 million (Rs 384 million), the mean  (median) age is 
twenty five years (seventeen years), and the mean (median) q is 1.39 (1.10). 
The table shows that, relative to unaffiliated firms, group affiliates are sta- 
tistically significantly larger and older (using either means or medians as 
the basis for comparison). Mean Tobin’s q is no different across group af- 
filiates and unaffiliated firms, although the median Tobin’s q of group affil- 
iates is statistically significantly greater (at the 5 percent level) than that 
of unaffiliated firms. 
The mean (median) ownership structure of the firms in our sample is as 
follows: foreign institutional ownership, 8.9 percent (1.6 percent); domes- 
tic institutional ownership, 13.9 percent (10.2 percent); insider ownership, 
27.1 percent (26.5 percent); directors’ ownership, 9.4 percent (3.4 per- 
cent); top fifty owners, 6.1 percent (4.0 percent). The remainder are held 
by dispersed shareholders. As shown in table 9.1, relative to unaffiliated 
firms, group affiliates have higher percentages of foreign and domestic in- 
stitutional ownership, higher percentages of insider ownership, and lower 
percentages  of directors’ ownership  and  top fifty ownership. All  these 
differences in categories of ownership are statistically significant at conven- 
tional levels (using either means or medians as the basis for comparison). 
Table 9.1 also reports changes in Tobin’s q between 1990 and 1994 (for 
the subsample of firms for which we  have data for both 1990 and 1994). 
The mean change in Tobin’s q across the entire sample is 0.58, statistically 
significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. The median change 
in Tobin’s q is 0.28, with 374 firms reporting positive changes in Tobin’s q 
and 114 reporting negative changes in Tobin’s q (the probability of this 
relative pattern of positive and negative changes in Tobin’s q being gener- 
ated by a binomial [n = 488, p  = 0.51 process is close to zero). The mean 
(median) change in Tobin’s q for group affiliates is 0.62 (0.31), with the 
mean being significantly different from zero, with 264 of 332 group affiliates 
reporting positive changes in Tobin’s q, The mean (median) change in Tob- 
in’s q for unaffiliated firms is 0.48 (0.24), with the mean being significantly 
different from zero, with  1 I0 of 156 unaffiliated firms reporting positive 
changes in Tobin’s q. The mean change in Tobin’s q for group affiliates 
is not statistically significantly different from that for unaffiliated firms. 
However, the median change in Tobin’s q for group affiliates is statistically 
significantly greater, at the 5 percent level, than that for unaffiliated firms. 
9.3.2  Univariate Analysis 
Panel A of table 9.2 displays mean  and median Tobin’s q values for 
group affiliates and unaffiliated firms, broken down by “high”- and “low”- 
foreign-ownership categories. The sample median value of foreign owner- 
ship, 1.61 percent, is used to divide the sample into high- and low-foreign- Table 9.2  Univariate Tests of Relation between Foreign and Domestic Institutional 
Ownership and Tobin’s q 
Number  Mean  Median 
of Firms  Tobin’s q  Tobin’s q 
A. Relation between Tobin’s q and 
Foreign Institutional Ownership 
Firms with high foreign 
institutional ownership: 
Group firms  306  1.58  1.26 
Nongroup firms  196  1.54  1.22 
Group firms  261  1 .IS***  1.01*** 
Firms with low foreign 
institutional ownership: 
Nongroup firms  24  1  1.23  0.98 
B. Relation between Tobin’s q and 
Domestic Institutional Ownership 
Firms with high domestic 
institutional ownership: 
Group firms  326  1.35  1.12 
Nongroup firms  176  1.43  1.09 
Firms with low domestic 
institutional ownership: 
Group firms  24 I  1.45  1.18 
Nongroup firms  26 I  1.33  1.04 
Source: Data obtained from CMIE for 1,004 firms (group affiliated and unaffiliated) traded 
on the RSE. 
Now  Tobin’s q is defined as (market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book 
value of debt)/(book value of assets). Foreign institutional ownership aggregates ownership 
of foreign corporations as well as that of foreign financial intermediaries. Domestic institu- 
tional ownership aggregates ownership in the hands of all state-run financial intermediaries. 
Group membership is based on definitions of groups from CMIE and is described in the text. 
In panel A. firms with high (low) foreign institutional ownership are defined as those for 
which  foreign institutional ownership exceeds (is less than) the sample median value for 
foreign institutional ownership,  1.61 percent. In panel B,  firms with high (low) domestic 
institutional ownership are defined as those for which domestic institutional ownership ex- 
cccds (is less than) the sample median value for domestic institutional ownership, 10.16 per- 
cent. Significance levels refer to difference of means or median tests between the high- and 
low-ownership categories. Mean differences are tested using a t-test with unequal variances; 
median differences are tested using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
In panel B, the mean (median) value for the high-domestic-ownership firms is not statisti- 
cally significantly different from thc mcan (median) value for low-domestic-ownership firms. 
Group and nongroup firms’ mean (median) values of Tobin’s q are not significantly different 
for thc high-domcstic-ownership subsample; for the low-domestic-ownership subsample, the 
means are not different between group and nongroup firms, but the medians are different at 
the 5 percent level. 
***Significantly diffcrcnt from the mean (median) value for the high-foreign-ownership firms 
at the 1 percent level. Group and nongroup firms’ mean (median) values of Tobin’s q are not 
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ownership  categories.  Mean  Tobin’s  q  is  higher  for  the  high-foreign- 
ownership category, for each of the group and nongroup samples, with the 
difference in means being significant at the 1 percent level. This is support- 
ive of the notion that foreign institutional ownership is correlated  with 
higher performance,  both for group firms and for nongroup firms. The 
univariate tests do not support the notion  that any beneficial effects of 
foreign institutional ownership are less likely to be felt in groups than in 
nongroups.  For each of the high- and low-foreign-ownership  categories, 
there is no statistically  significant  difference in  mean Tobin’s q between 
group and nongroup firms. 
The median  results in the same panel yield identical results.  Median 
Tobin’s q is higher for the high-foreign-ownership category than it is for 
the low-foreign-ownership category, for both groups and nongroups. The 
difference of medians is significant at the 1 percent level (Wilcoxon signed- 
rank test) in both instances. However, within each of the high- and low- 
foreign-ownership categories, there is no statistically significant difference 
in medians across groups and nongroups,  although median Tobin’s q is 
higher for group firms than for nongroup firms. 
Similar univariate tests are performed for “high” and ‘‘low’’ categories 
of domestic institutional ownership and reported in panel B of table 9.2. 
The sample median value of domestic institutional ownership, 10.16 per- 
cent, is used to divide the sample into high- and low-domestic-ownership 
categories.  There is  no significant  difference in the mean  (and median) 
Tobin’s q between high- and low-domestic-ownership firms for either the 
group-firm subsample or the nongroup-firm subsample. These univariate 
statistics do not suggest a positive relation between domestic institutional 
ownership and firm performance. There is also no evidence of a significant 
difference between the mean and the median Tobin’s q between group and 
nongroup firms, in the subsample with high domestic institutional owner- 
ship; in the low-domestic-ownership subsample, the mean q is not signifi- 
cantly different, but the median q is significantly higher for the group firms 
than for the nongroup firms. 
We also perform similar univariate tests of the relation between changes 
in Tobin’s q and foreign and domestic institutional ownership, reported in 
table 9.3. Here high and low foreign and domestic institutional ownership 
are defined on the basis of the medians of the sample on which the changes 
in Tobin’s q analyses are carried out (the medians are 3.1 percent for for- 
eign ownership and  14.3 percent for domestic  ownership). As  reported 
in panel  A of table 9.3, we  find  that  the mean and median  changes in 
Tobin’s q for group affiliates are significantly higher for the high-foreign- 
ownership sample than for the low-foreign-ownership sample. In contrast, 
the changes in Tobin’s q are not statistically significantly different across 
high- and low-foreign-ownership samples for unaffiliated firms. 
As  reported in panel B of  table 9.3, we  also find that mean change in Table 9.3  Univariate Tests of Relation between Foreign and Domestic Institutional 
Ownership and Change in Tobin’s q between 1990 and 1994 
Number of  Mean Change 
Firms  in Tobin’s 4 








A. Relation between Change 










B. Relation between Change 
in Tobin‘s q and Domestic 
Institutional Ownership 
Firms with high domestic 
institutional ownership: 
Group firms  185  .50 
Nongroup firms  59  .44 
Firms with low domestic 
institutional ownership: 
Group firms  147  .78** 
Nongroup firms  97  .50 
Source; Data obtained from CMIE, for 488 firms (group affiliated and unaffiliated)  traded 
on the BSE for which data exist for both 1990 and 1994. 
Nore: Tobin’s 4 is defined as (market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book 
value of deht)/(book value of assets). Foreign institutional ownership aggregates ownership 
of foreign corporations as well as that of foreign financial intermediaries. Domestic institu- 
tional ownership aggregates ownership in the hands of all state-run financial intermediaries. 
Group membership is based on definitions of groups from CMIE  and is described in the text. 
In panel A, firms with high (low) foreign institutional ownership are defined as those for 
which  foreign  institutional ownership exceeds  (is less than) the sample median value for 
foreign institutional ownership, 3.07 percent.  In panel B, firms with high (low) domestic 
institutional ownership are defined as those for which domestic institutional ownership ex- 
ceeds (is less than) the sample median value for domestic institutional ownership, 14.30 per- 
cent. Significancc levels refer to difference of means or median tests between the high- and 
low-ownership categories. Mean differences are tested using a /-test with unequal variances; 
median differences are tested using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
**Significantly different from the relevant value for the high-domestic-ownership firms at 
the 5 percent level. The mean value for the high-domestic-ownership firms is not statistically 
significantly different from  the  mean  (median) value  for  low-domestic-ownership  firms. 
Group and nongroup firms’ mean (median) values of Tobin’s q are not significantly different 
for the high-domestic-ownership subsample; for the low-domestic-ownership subsample, the 
means and medians are different between group and nongroup firms at the 10 percent level. 
***Significantly different from the relevant value for the high-foreign-ownership firms at the 
1 percent level. The mean value  is not different between high- and low-foreign-ownership 
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Tobin’s q is statistically significantly lower for group affiliates with higher 
domestic institutional ownership than for those with lower domestic insti- 
tutional ownership, although the difference in the median change in Tob- 
in’s  q  is  not statistically  significant.  Neither  the mean nor the median 
changes in Tobin’s q are statistically significantly different across the high- 
and low-domestic-ownership categories for the unaffiliated firms. 
These univariate results suggest that changes in Tobin’s q are generally 
positively correlated with the presence  of foreign institutional ownership 
and negatively correlated with the presence of domestic institutional own- 
ership, with the effects being stronger for group affiliates than for unaffil- 
iated firms. 
9.3.3 
Regression results reported in table 9.4 examine the effects of different 
categories of  owners on performance. Using OLS for these estimations 
implicitly assumes that the error term is uncorrelated across the firms in a 
group. However, this assumption may be unwarranted,  especially across 
firms affiliated with a group. Following Moulton (1990), we note that ob- 
servations  sharing an observable characteristic  like  group membership 
may also share unobservable characteristics that may cause the error terms 
to be correlated. This would cause the standard errors obtained using OLS 
to be understated, leading to potentially spurious claims of statistical sig- 
nificance,  with  the problem  being  more acute the greater the extent of 
within-group unobservable correlations (Moulton 1986). Accordingly, we 
use an estimation approach that assumes that observations are indepen- 
dent across groups but relaxes the independence assumption within groups. 
Additionally,  the standard errors reported are also heteroskedastic-con- 
sistent White standard errors. All estimations  control for industry fixed 
effects. 
Model 1 regresses Tobin’s q on the levels of different categories of own- 
ership for the 983 firms for which  the required  data exist in  1993. The 
specification includes variables to control for size (log of sales) and age. 
The results show that the presence of foreign institutional investors is cor- 
related with higher values of Tobin’s q (significant at the 1 percent level). 
The presence of domestic institutional investors has no discernible effect. 
The only other ownership category with a statistically significant effect is 
that  of insider  ownership, which  is positively  correlated  with  Tobin’s q 
(significant at the 1 percent level). We note that the effects of foreign insti- 
tutional ownership and insider ownership are roughly equal in magnitude 
(the mean foreign institutional ownership is one-third the mean insider 
ownership, but the point  estimate  of the former is  roughly  three  times 
larger than that of the latter). 
Model 2 repeats the previous  specification but allows for different ef- 
fects of foreign and domestic institutional ownership across group affiliates 
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F = 2.45*** 
Source: Data obtained from CMIE for group-affiliated and unaffiliated  firms traded on the BSE 
Note: Tobin’s q is defined as (market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book value of 
debt)/(book value of assets). Sales are measured in millions of rupees, with an approximate exchange 
rate at this time of  U.S.$l .OO = Rs 30.00. Age measures number of years since incorporation. Foreign 
institutional ownership aggregates ownership of foreign corporations as well as that of foreign financial 
intermediaries. Domestic institutional ownership aggregates ownership in the hands of all state-run 
financial intermediaries. Insider ownership includes the stakes held by  group family members and by 
other group firms and measures stakes held by insiders for nongroup firms. Directors’ ownership cap- 
tures the ownership of nonfamily directors. Top 50 ownership captures the largest shareholders not 
included  in aforementioned  categories. Group membership is based  on definitions of groups from 
CMIE and is described in the text. OLS estimation is used for models  I, 2,  and 4.  but we  relax the 
assumption of independence of the error term within groups, following Moulton (1986, 1990). Model 
3 reports  results of  a random-effects generalized-least-squares  panel estimation. The &statistics re- 
ported in parentheses are based on standard errors that correct for heteroskedasticity. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level. Business Groups, Foreign Intermediaries, and Corporate Governance  283 
and unaffiliated firms. The results show no support for the hypothesis that 
there is a significant difference in the relation between performance and 
institutional ownership (either foreign or domestic) between  group and 
nongroup firms.23  This is inconsistent  with the notion  that institutional 
investors find it more difficult to monitor business groups relative to non- 
group firms. 
It is important to exercise caution in interpreting the observed positive 
relation between performance and the level of foreign institutional owner- 
ship. Our analysis cannot distinguish between the possibility that foreign 
institutional investors are buying better-managed  firms, on the one hand, 
and the possibility that foreign institutional investors are bringing to bear 
improved governance on firms, on the other. However, if  we  knew that 
foreign ownership existed prior to 1993, then a correlation of foreign insti- 
tutional ownership with the Tobin’s q in  1993 would be less likely to sup- 
port the former hyp~thesis.~~  Accordingly, we  reestimate both regression 
1 and regression 2 for the sample of firms for which our ownership data is 
pre-1993 and find no difference in the results.25  We interpret this as sugges- 
tive of a governance role played by foreign institutional investors. 
We  also have access to some data for other years surrounding 1993. We 
estimate similar year-by-year specifications for each of these years; again, 
in  all cases, foreign  institutional  shareholding is positively  significantly 
correlated  with  Tobin’s q, while  domestic  institutional  shareholding is 
sometimes significantly negatively correlated with Tobin’s q. 
We also report the results of a random-effects generalized-least-squares 
panel estimation (model 3) for the 488 firms for which we had data for the 
five-year period  1  990-94.26 This sample is half the size of the sample used 
for the earlier specifications, although the proportion of group affiliates is 
higher in this sample: 68 percent versus 57 percent  for the earlier,  1993 
sample. The mean Tobin’s q for the panel of firms is not different from 
that for the earlier 1993 sample. 
The panel estimation confirms the earlier results, but we  also find that 
domestic institutional ownership is negatively correlated with Tobin’s q. 
23. We also include an interaction term between insider ownership and group membership. 
The point estimate on this term is positive, with a p-value of 0.14; the magnitude and signifi- 
cance of the other point estimates do not change appreciably. 
24. This reasoning would be  suspect the greater is the positive correlation between the 
1993 Tobin’s q and the Tobin’s q of years immediately prior to 1993. 
25. We know only when the ownership data were reported. It is possible, cg., that owner- 
ship data reported in 1994 were accurate descriptors of the ownership structure in prior years 
as well. 
26. The equation estimated is of  the form q,, = a  + x,,p  + v, + E,,.  The estimator is a 
weighted average  of  the estimates produced  by  the “between” estimator  (which  exploits 
the variation between the means of the firms and is based on the equation q, = a + X,p + 
v8 + E,)  and the “within” estimator (or the fixed-effects estimator, which exploits the vari- 
ation across the various observations within each firm and is based  on an estimation of 
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We note that the magnitude of the effect of foreign institutional ownership 
(evaluated at the sample mean) is roughly the same as the magnitude of 
the effect of domestic institutional ownership. It is important to note the 
sources of variation underlying the panel estimation. Ownership values do 
not vary from year to year; however, firm sales, Tobin’s q, and age do vary 
from year to year.” A X2-test  reveals the joint significance, at the 1 percent 
level, of all coefficients.** 
In model 4, we look at the effects of ownership on changes in Tobin’s q, 
using data from the firms in the 1990-94 balanced panel. The dependent 
variable is the change in Tobin’s q between 1990 and 1994. OLS, with corre- 
lated errors permitted for firms belonging to a particular group, is employed 
again, with heteroskedastic-consistent  standard errors reported.  We find 
that foreign institutional ownership is positively correlated with changes 
in Tobin’s q while domestic institutional ownership is negatively correlated 
with changes in Tobin’s q;  the other kinds of ownership do not display any 
correlation with the dependent variable. There is also no evidence of any 
differential effect across group affiliates and unaffiliated firmsz9 
A caveat about causality is in order with these estimations as well. We 
cannot reliably distinguish between the following two possibilities: (a)  for- 
eign institutional owners have improved corporate governance in the firms 
in which they invest and have thus caused increases in Tobin’s q, and (h) 
foreign  institutional  investors  have invested  in those firms that ex  ante 
showed the greatest likelihood of improving performance in the deregulat- 
ing post- 199  1 environment. 
To  summarize thus far, there are significant differences in the relation 
between  ownership and performance  for domestic  and foreign  institu- 
tional investors in the early 1990s in India. The role of the foreign institu- 
tional investors is consistent with their provision of superior monitoring 
services. We are left, however, with a puzzle. In India, as in other countries, 
the rhetoric associated with the lack of transparency and opacity of busi- 
ness groups seems difficult to reconcile with there being no difference in 
the relation  between performance  and foreign  ownership for group and 
nongroup firms. We investigate this issue further in the next section. 
27. Given this, it is  not surprising that the  R2 “between” is much higher  than the  R2 
“within.” Note that these R2’s do not have the property of OLS R”s,  in the sense that they 
are not tantamount to the fraction of  the variance explained. However, they are squared 
correlations of the prediction implied in the corresponding equation. 
28. Since small-sample properties of the random-effects generalized least squares panel 
estimator are unknown, we do not report an F-statistic. 
29. The reported estimations use 1993 values for log (sales) and age, although the results 
are not sensitive to using averages of these values over the period 1990-94.  We also investi- 
gate an interaction term between insider ownership and group membership; the point esti- 
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9.3.4  Determinants of Institutional Ownership 
Table 9.5 reports the results of some estimations of the determinants of 
institutional ownership in  India. In model  1, we  estimate the extent of 
foreign ownership in a firm as a function of a set of firm and group charac- 
teristics. The estimation method is a tobit that allows for correlated errors 
across all firms in a particular group (i.e., the estimation assumes indepen- 
dence of the error term across all pairs of observations that are not mem- 
bers of the same group and allows for correlation in the error terms for all 
pairs of observations that are within a group). Firm characteristics include 
a measure of firm size (logarithm of sales), its past performance (measured 
as a simple average of the Tobin’s q values  of past years),  and its past 
variability in performance. One of the group characteristics of interest is 
the extent to which institutional investors invest in a group as opposed to 
in individual firms within the same group.3o  This would manifest itself as 
ownership stakes in multiple group firms. To address this, we compute the 
mean level of foreign ownership for all other firms in the same group as 
the firm in question and use this as one of our regressors. Since our interest 
is in understanding why the alleged opacity of groups does not appear to 
have any effect on monitoring, we also focus on the extent to which inter- 
nal capital markets operate within groups. Discussions of lack of transpar- 
ency of groups typically suggest that the major concern is the relatively 
fluid mobility of funds across group firms. To capture this construct em- 
pirically, for each firm we use as regressors measures of the extent to which 
it invests money in, lends money to, or is the recipient of receivables from 
other group affiliates (all these variables  are set to zero for unaffiliated 
firms). 
Model 1 demonstrates that foreign ownership is an increasing function 
of firm size and of past performance and a negative function of past vari- 
ability in performance.  Results also suggest that foreign institutional in- 
vestors are less likely to invest in group firms relative to nongroup firms 
(the point estimate on the group dummy is negative and significant). How- 
ever, if they do invest in group firms, foreign institutional owners appear 
to do so in those groups with minimal internal capital market transactions. 
All three of the measures that proxy for the use of internal capital markets 
have negative point estimates, with  one being significant  at the conven- 
30. Why might institutional investors be swayed by group-level considerations rather than 
only by  firm-level considerations? Amsden and Hikino (1 994) have argued that the group 
served as an efficient organizational intermediary in the market for cross-border technology 
investments. Similarly, one might expect that the group could also serve as an efficient finan- 
cial intermediary in  the market for cross-border allocation of capital. To  the extent that 
domestic institutional investment was at least partly a result of a noneconomic calculus, the 
group-level  “industrial embassies” in the capital city designed to foster relations with the 
government (Encarnation 1989) should translate into the importance of group attributes in 
the determination of ownership stakes of domestic institutional investors. Table 9.5  Tobit Analysis of Relation between Foreign and Domestic Institutional 
Ownership and Firm and Group Characteristics 
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-0.009 
(-0.075) 






variable is domestic 
institutional ownership) 
-4.190* 
(- I .625) 












0.1  14* 
(1.6  15) 
2.21  I 
(I.  166) 
800 
207.4*  * * 
Source:  Data obtained from CMIE for group-affiliated and unalliliated firms traded on the 
BSE. 
Note: Tobin’s q is defined as (market value of equity + book value of preferred stock + book 
value of debt)/(book value of assets). Past performance is defined as the simple average of as 
many annual measures of Tobin’s q (computed as above) as available for the firm in question. 
Variability in past performance is defined as the variance of daily stock returns over the prior 
year. Sales are measured in millions of rupees, with an approximate exchange rate at this 
time of U.S.$l.OO  = Rs 30.00. Group membership is based on definitions of groups from 
CMIE and is described in the text. Investment in other group firms is the firm’s total invest- 
ment in shares and debentures of other group affiliates and is set to iero for unaffiliated 
firms. Receivables from group firms includes short-term deposits and loans (maturity of less 
than one year) given by  the firm to others in the group and is set to zero for unaffiliated 
firms. Loans from group firms is the loans received by the firm from others in the group and 
is set to zero for unaffiliated  firms. The estimation method used  is a tobit that allows for 
correlated errors across all firms in a group and assumes that errors arc independent other- 
wise. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent Icvel. 
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tional level. We interpret this as evidence that foreign institutional inves- 
tors seek out those groups where the lack of transparency is least likely to 
be a problem or invest in those groups where they are able to curtail the 
operation of internal capital markets and the loss of transparency that 
might result. The results also provide support for the idea that foreign 
institutional investors invest in groups rather than in individual firms. The 
variable that measures the  average level  of foreign ownership in  other 
group affiliates has a positive coefficient (significant at the 1 percent level). 
We  repeated these estimations for the subsample of group affiliates only, 
with qualitatively similar results. 
As a point of comparison, model 2 estimates the relation between the 
level of domestic institutional ownership and firm characteristics. We find 
that the ownership stake is a positive function of size. However, in contrast 
to foreign ownership, there is no significant correlation between past per- 
formance and domestic institutional ownership. In fact, there is weak evi- 
dence that the correlation is negative. This result is consistent with Indian 
institutional  investors  having  insufficient incentives to monitor perfor- 
mance and also with their perverse incentives to bail out troubled firms 
by investing in them further. Results also show that there is no significant 
difference in domestic institutional ownership between group affiliates and 
unaffiliated firms. However, as with foreign institutional investors, there 
appears to be some evidence that domestic institutional investors invest in 
groups as a whole rather than in individual firms in a group. The point 
estimate on the variable measuring investments in affiliates of the same 
group is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. Finally, in sharp 
contrast to the case of foreign institutional  investors, domestic institu- 
tional investors appear to invest in  groups where there is a high level of 
internal capital market activity. Each of the three indicators of internal 
capital market activity displays a positive sign, and two of them are sig- 
nificant at conventional levels. 
In summary, we  find that foreign institutional investors have substan- 
tially different effects on firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s q,  than 
do domestic institutional investors. The positive effects of the former, and 
the negative effects of the latter, however, are no different for group affili- 
ates than they are for unaffiliated firms. This is inconsistent with the gen- 
eral perception that group affiliates are less transparent than are unaffili- 
ated firms. A partial resolution of this puzzle appears to be that foreign 
institutional investors seek out those groups where transparency is less of 
a problem, in marked contrast to domestic institutional investors. 
9.4  Summary 
We  investigate the relation between performance and ownership in In- 
dia, an economy in  the process of significant deregulation beginning in 288  Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu 
1991. We investigate the interaction between three different kinds of con- 
centrated owners in India: the insider ownership held by the families that 
manage the firms that constitute business groups; the ownership held by 
domestic financial institutions, typically acting in concert; and the owner- 
ship held by foreign financial institutions,  recent  arrivals on the Indian 
economic landscape. 
Our study is motivated by several observations. A review of the litera- 
ture suggests that the external monitoring of group affiliates poses more 
challenges than that of unaffiliated firms. Groups are reputed to be less 
transparent  than nongroups and to have more opportunities, given their 
more complicated  structures, to engage in questionable practices to the 
detriment  of  minority  shareholders.  Their generally  better  links to the 
political  apparatus in the country also insulate them from external inter- 
ference and monitoring. Domestic financial institutions in India are gen- 
erally insufficiently oriented, if at all, toward the task of monitoring man- 
agers  and  are thus  unlikely  to exercise  effective  governance.  Foreign 
institutional investors, only recently allowed to own shares in Indian com- 
panies, are a potential source not only of capital but also of monitoring 
technology from advanced capital markets. 
Our evidence suggests that domestic financial institutions in India are 
ineffective monitors, whereas foreign institutional investment is associated 
with significant monitoring benefits: firm performance is positively corre- 
lated with the presence of foreign institutional ownership and negatively 
correlated with the presence of domestic institutional ownership. Surpris- 
ingly, however, we find that there is no evidence of a difference in this re- 
lation between group affiliates and unaffiliated firms, suggesting that mon- 
itoring is no less effective for group affiliates than it is for unaffiliated firms. 
At first glance, the lack of transparency of groups does not appear to pose 
a differential impediment to monitoring by foreign institutional investors. 
We  probe this further by investigating factors correlated with the pres- 
ence of greater foreign institutional ownership (and compare those factors 
to factors correlated with the presence of greater  domestic institutional 
ownership). After controlling for industry fixed effects, firm size, and the 
past  performance  of firms, we  find that  foreign  owners  are indeed  less 
likely to invest in group affiliates than in unaffiliated firms, perhaps be- 
cause of the problems associated with monitoring groups. However, when 
they do invest in groups, they appear to seek out those groups where the 
transparency  problem, as proxied by  the greater incidence of intragroup 
financial transactions, is lowest. 
We  interpret this collective evidence as suggesting that foreign institu- 
tional investors are a source not only of financing but also of scarce moni- 
toring skills in emerging markets such as India. Given the rapidly accumu- 
lating evidence of the failure of domestic intermediaries in a number of 
emerging markets and the recent opening up to foreign investment of doz- Business Groups, Foreign Intermediaries, and Corporate Governance  289 
ens of countries (Sachs and Warner 1995), these results regarding the na- 
ture of investments sought by foreign institutional investors and the effects 
of such investments on the governance of  business groups that are tradi- 
tionally viewed as difficult to monitor are worthy of note. 
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Comment  Bernard Yeung 
This is a timely paper reporting important results,  one that deserves  a 
round of applause. The paper shows that foreign investors provide impor- 
tant monitoring functions in an emerging economy as it integrates with 
the rest of the world. This is an important contribution that will receive 
the attention of policy makers and students of emerging economies and 
financial economics. 
The authors describe well  a  suboptimal  situation  in  some emerging 
economies such as India. First, “firm groups” are common, and they are 
hard to monitor. Second, the incentives to monitor may be absent. Govern- 
ment muddling may leave financial intermediaries no incentive to moni- 
tor. Monitoring may not even be profitable.  Insiders’ control and cross- 
holdings allow entrenched corporate control (see, e.g., Morck, Stangeland, 
and Yeung, chap. 11 in this volume). The lack of protection for outsiders’ 
rights and the presence  of corrupted government may make the holding 
of mispriced  firms unprofitable because share prices often do not reflect 
firm-specific information (see, e.g., Morck, Yeung, and Yu  2000). It fol- 
lows that emerging economies may have a severe lack of local monitoring 
skills. These features induce managerial agency costs, allow bad manage- 
ment to escape from being disciplined, and ultimately impede the realloca- 
tion  of  asset  controls  from  non-value-creating  firms  to value-creating 
firms. Moreover, the situation is difficult to change because the entrenched 
have the resources and the political connections to preserve the status quo. 
Foreign influence can break the logjam,’ and I believe that that is the 
Bernard Yeung is the Krasnoff Professor of International Business and professor of eco- 
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most important contribution of the paper. As the authors point out, sev- 
eral  positive  developments  in  corporate governance  occurred  in  India 
since its balance-of-payments crisis in 1991. An important change is that 
restrictions on the entry of foreign investors were eliminated and regula- 
tions on their investments substantially clarified. Essentially, foreign insti- 
tutional players can now become active investors.  Similar changes have 
been  experienced in many other emerging markets.* Do foreign institu- 
tional  investors play  a positive  role? Experiencing  economic  problems, 
many politicians in emerging markets, particularly those in Asia, consider 
foreign institutional investors to be speculative devils causing market tur- 
moil. Khanna and Palepu show that foreign institutional investors provide 
a highly valuable monitoring function. 
Their work relies on the statistical relation between Tobin’s q and for- 
eign institutional investors’ share ownership using data between 1990 and 
1994 from the Bombay Stock Exchange. They find that foreign investors’ 
ownership is positively correlated with a firm’s market value and is also 
related  to the firm’s postreform improvement  in market  value  between 
1990 and 1994. Their results clearly suggest that foreign institutional in- 
vestors invest in good firms and that their monitoring may contribute di- 
rectly to improved firm performance. 
Furthermore,  they find that domestic institutional ownership is some- 
times negatively correlated with q and change in q between 1990 and 1994. 
Domestic institutional investors tend to invest in groups where there is a 
high level of internal capital market activity; presumably, firms in these 
groups are not more difficult to monitor. The result confirms that domestic 
institutional investors in India do  not carry out their monitoring function. 
The relations outlined  above hold  among both unaffiliated firms and 
group  firms. This  suggests,  perhaps,  that stand-alone  firms  and group 
firms are not different. The authors further find that foreign institutional 
investors tend to avoid group firms that are more difficult to monitor. As 
a consequence, foreign institutional investors’ monitoring contribution is 
similar between  independent firms and group firms. In my  opinion, the 
message is very positive:  although group firms  are difficult to monitor, 
foreign investors manage to find some that they can monitor. The implica- 
tion is that there is pressure on group firms with only murky information 
to improve their transparency. 
To  some, the results may raise the question, Does foreign institutional 
investors’ ownership raise firm value because of their monitoring or be- 
cause they  are able to pick up better firms that make good postreform 
improvements? The authors attempt to shed light on the question by relat- 
ing 1993 q and pre-1993 foreign institutional ownership data. If foreign 
ownership is merely a positive signal, then a positive relation between 1993 
2. For a comprehensive listing, see the appendix to Kim and Singal (2000). 294  Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu 
q and pre-1993 foreign ownership is unlikely. However, if foreign owner- 
ship contributes via active monitoring, a positive relation will exist. The 
authors find a positive relationship. 
While  the  additional  result  helps,  it  does  not  totally  eliminate  a 
“tracking” story, which the authors raise at the end of section 9.3.3. Sup- 
pose that foreign institutional investors track firms that have a high proba- 
bility of improving their corporate behavior. When a tracked firm indeed 
implements  improvements,  its market  value  rises because  the improve- 
ments have been realized. Thus, even if the foreign investors’ contribution 
is merely tracking better firms, 1993 q and pre-1993 foreign ownership are 
positively correlated. 
The differentiation of the tracking story and the monitoring story may 
not be as important as it appears. The undeniable result  is that foreign 
institutional investors  are linked with better local companies, no matter 
whether  they  do so by  cherry picking or by  active monitoring.  Foreign 
investors, at the very least, improve the information content of the emerg- 
ing economy’s stock market. Khanna and Palepu provide  the empirical 
evidence to support the belief that foreign investors help capital markets 
in emerging markets better carry out their capital allocation function. The 
results also indicate that we cannot assume that foreign investors have an 
information disadvantage. 
This thinking begs the question  of  how  foreign investors change  the 
equilibrium  allocation  of  capital. Clearly, companies self-select to post 
only murky information, or companies not able to improve as much as 
other firms are now more readily identifiable. They should have reduced 
access 10  capital, and they must either change or shrink. The results pre- 
sented in the paper hint that, following the entrance of foreign investors, 
a transition  from one equilibrium  to another has to take place, just  as 
those presented in Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung (chap.  11 in this vol- 
ume) do. 
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